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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This paper aims at dealing with community participation in the field of security in 
France and Italy, thanks to a comparison between two case studies: the “Projet Grenoble Sud” 
(“South Grenoble Project”) in Grenoble (France, see map 1) and the “Progetto Città Sicure” 
(“Safe City Project”) in Modena (Italy, see map 2).
1
 It must be precised that in this paper, we 
understand “community participation” in a very extensive way, in order to deal with the 
diversity of meanings in both countries. In Grenoble, official discourses tend to speak of 
“participation des habitants” (inhabitants participation) and “quartier” (neighbourhood), 
whereas in Modena, they focus on “coinvolgimento dei cittadini” (citizens’ involvement) and 
“comunità” (community). The community participation model in Modena lies in a 
neighbourhood watch structure, which was the municipal answer to the spontaneous citizens’ 
mobilizations on security problems that occurred in the mid-nineties, in the national context 
of political party crisis and rising of immigration flow. On the opposite, the community 
participation pattern in Grenoble results from a top down process, driven by the local 
government who led a consultative process that enabled people to make proposals to improve 
security in their neighbourhoods, and then to maintain control over the effective 
implementation of the retained proposals. This mode of community participation can be 
qualified as “program-building and implementation-controlling”.  
The word “community” is not used in France but in Italy, it can be associated with 
shared moral values, where social and civic obligations are learned and self-reliance, mutual 
aid and volunteering are practised, i.e. where social capital is quite diffused. We define 
“social capital” as the component of political culture that corresponds to trust, reciprocity and 
the amount of resources that allows collective action  (Almagisti and Messina, 2005). So, it 
corresponds to some elements that belong to the two “political subcultures” defined by 
Trigilia (1981; 1986), i.e. the Red one (rooted in Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and 
Marches) and the White one (rooted in Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 
Trentino-Alto Adige). The definition of neighbourhood is also problematic, both in terms of 
spatial scale and of its varying psychological and social significance for residents (Kearns and 
Parkinson, 2001). Therefore, we understand neighbourhood in a restricted way, as the 
                                               
1
 This contribution is based on my PhD research in progress about local security policies in both countries, 
focussing on four cities (Lyons and Grenoble in France; Bologna and Modena in Italy). 
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geographically delimited territory where the local community lives, which can be considered 
as a source of social identity (see Trigilia, 1981; 1986). This contribution mainly seeks to 
investigate the relationship between the Physical and the Social and the influence of these 
variables on community participation in the field of security. 
 
The relationship between the physical and social dimensions of neighbourhoods has 
been studied first by the Chicago school. Shaw and Mc Kay presented in 1942 their concept 
of “social disorganisation”, pointing out that there was a statistical correlation between some 
social variables (school failure rates, high juvenile delinquency rates, high crime rates) and 
the physical decay of some areas. A comparison of these rates over a long period revealed a 
great regularity (that is to say whereas the local population has changed), which made the two 
researchers think that the crime rate depended on the social organisation of these areas. 
Deprivation, social heterogeneity and residential instability were not however direct causes 
for crime: there was an intermediate variable, “social disorganisation”, i.e. the inability of 
residents to live together, to cooperate, because of the absence of formal and informal strong 
relations. The ethnic heterogeneity obstructed the building of a common value system, while 
deprivation and residential instability depressed a process of identification with the 
neighbourhood. The lack of relations, then, limited informal social control and therefore 
favoured crime (Shaw and McKay, 1969). 
Many ulterior studies were based on the Chicago School’s analysis, such as Jacobs’s 
strong criticism of urban planning strategies of functional areas, which destroyed social 
diversity in big cities and then favoured crime (1962), Wilson and Kelling’s famous Broken 
Windows theory (1982) or Skogan’s analysis of the spiral of decay in some American 
neighbourhoods (1990). The Chicago School’s model still seems valid, and some 
contemporaneous researchers have built their researches on its findings, such as Roché, for 
instance, who also used “Second” Chicago School’s analyses (Becker and Goffman). 
Roché (2000) clearly expressed the retraction mechanism generated by the feeling of 
insecurity and noticed that one of the most important aspects of security today lies in the 
residential cohabitation between lower and middle classes (Roché, 2002: 120-121), especially 
in decaying neighbourhoods. Indeed, he proposed a renewed analysis of the Broken Windows 
theory for France, using several quantitative researches he had carried out in Grenoble (1990), 
Saint-Etienne (1995), Romans and Paris (1998). He pointed out that disorders had an 
influence on citizens’ feeling of insecurity and trust towards institutions. He included this 
element into an explanatory model of citizens’ adaptation behaviour in sensitive 
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neighbourhoods, based on the idea that the diffusion of disorders incited the most sensitive 
people to incivilities to exit by moving. Since only a small proportion had managed to, those 
who couldn’t leave felt frustrated, but at the same time, sought to make the institutions 
(housing, police, municipality, etc.) pay attention to their situation. The trust towards 
institutions then started decreasing. This « disorders triangle », combining frequent 
incivilities, a threat generating retraction and a low level of trust towards institutions, could 
then favour the development of crime.  
 
The dynamics of retraction described by Roché is quite interesting since it implicitly 
underlines the responsibility of institutions, which didn’t pay attention to what could be called 
the « security demand » expressed by the local population. The two security projects 
developed in Grenoble and Modena, and partly based on community participation, aim at 
answering to this security demand, which is however expressed in a different way in both 
cities, as I’ll show it. Whereas the impoverishment dynamic that hit French “grands 
ensembles” was partly due to the middle class’ strategy of “exit” (Hirschman, 1970), it seems 
that in Modena, and more generally speaking in big urban centres –especially in Northern 
Italy- the local population chose “voice”. Lots of researchers support the idea that, in France, 
“sensitive” neighbourhoods are now unable to mobilize. What is called “mixité sociale” 
(“social mixing”) -i.e. the melting pot degree of inhabitants with different socio-economic 
status- henceforth depends on middle classes, whose departure generates impoverishment 
phenomenon in suburbs. Some French researchers had already noticed, in a premonitory 
analysis, that “social mixing” was a myth, since making people physically live together did 
not mean making them socially live together (Chamboredon and Lemaire, 1970).  
Besides, in Modena, the local population was really co-involved in the policy-making 
process and participated actively in the co-production of security. Indeed, some citizens were 
involved in an informal neighbourhood watch structure (Poletti, 2002; 2005). In Grenoble, 
and more generally in France, citizens’ mobilizations on security topics are usually quite rare 
and, as far as community participation is concerned, it is often uneasy to implement because 
of the effective reluctance of elected officials and civil servants, in spite of the official 
discourse. The community participation pattern in Grenoble can be qualified as “program-
building and implementation-controlling” but it is far from the neighbourhood watch model.  
 
To explore these two main differences (the mobilization differential and the co-
involvement differential), I first present the main social and physical characteristics of the two 
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neighbourhoods studied, that is to say Villeneuve-VO in Grenoble and Crocetta in Modena. In 
the following sections, I then present the different sets of hypothesis I had to make in order to 
investigate the two community participation patterns. So, in the second section, I examine the 
influence of classical variables, such as socio-economic status, neighbourhoods’ physical 
aspects and residents’ feeling of insecurity to explain the mobilization differential. In the third 
section, I explore the diffusion of institutional mediation channels in the two neighbourhoods. 
Lastly, in the fourth section, I try to point out the influence of historical factors on the 
definition of the problem. 
 
 
 
I. Some elements to understand why Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta were targeted 
by municipal security policies  
 
 
 As a small introduction, we have to give a few data about Grenoble and Modena (see 
maps 3 and 6). Grenoble is a medium city with above 160,000 inhabitants, located in the 
middle of a 400,000 inhabitant urban area, in the heart of the French Alps. The city is located 
in a glacier valley, surrounded by three mountains (Chartreuse, Belledonne and Vercors). 
Grenoble, host to the Winter Olympics in 1968, has known a fast economic development 
since this period. The main industrial activities are now engineering, electronics, electrical 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals (approximately 43,200 jobs); but also paper, 
metallurgy, construction materials, textile, food products, plastics, industrial and consumer 
equipment (approximately 32,850 jobs). The presence of a large number of research 
laboratories in Grenoble is a key feature of the economic background of Isère. Indeed, there 
are approximately 50,000 students in the urban area and 18,200 people work in research in the 
city, making it the leading centre in France, outside Paris, for public and private research. So, 
Grenoble is an attractive city for students and high-qualified professions, especially 
foreigners. However, in 1999, the unemployment rate was 16%, that is to say higher that the 
national average (see table 1). 
As far as Modena is concerned, there are approximately 180,000 inhabitants, which 
make it the second largest city in Emilia-Romagna. This region, which belongs to the “Third 
Italy” (see for instance Bagnasco, 1991; Caciagli, 1988; 1995; Trigilia, 1981; 2001), is one of 
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the richest ones. The city has been marked by a strong industrial development since the fifties 
(metallurgy, car industry such as Ferrari and Bugatti, food industry, textile and ceramics), 
which engendered a growth of the local population, fed by inter-regional immigration flux of 
labour forces. The city started growing, even absorbing small close localities, such as San 
Lazzaro or Madonnina. However, Modena started losing inhabitants in 1980 (6000 
approximately until 1995) partly because of the industry crisis and the rise of the tertiary 
sector. But the city managed to resist the economic crisis: small-scale industries gathered to 
create consortiums in definite sectors such as ceramics, textile or food industry. Moreover, the 
proportion of managers, intellectual professions and employees is higher than the Italian 
average whereas the proportion of workers and unskilled manual workers is lower. Lastly, it 
must be underlined that in 2004, the unemployment rate was only 2.6% (see table 2). 
 
Table 1: Unemployment rate, average income and professional groups’ employment rate 
in Grenoble 
 
 Grenoble France 
 
  
Unemployment rate (1999) 16,1% 12,9% 
   
Average income (1999) 16,480 €  20,363 €  
   
farmers  0% 2,4% 
Artisans, shopkeepers and 
managers 
4,9% 6,4% 
Executives and intellectual 
professions 
21,4% 12,1% 
Intermediate professions 26,3% 22,1% 
Employees  29,2% 29,9% 
Manual workers 18,2% 27,1% 
   
total 100% 100% 
 
Adapted from Insee, 1999. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Unemployment rate, average income and professional groups’ employment rate 
in Modena 
 
 
 Modena Italy 
   
unemployment rate (2004) 2.6% 8% 
   
Average income 22,198 €  14,939 € 
   
Managers and directors 3.0% 1.6% 
Intellectual, scientific professions and of elevated specialization 11.4% 8.1% 
Intermediate professions (technical) 23.9% 18.8% 
 6 
Employees  14.6% 12.9% 
Professions relative to sales and services  14.1% 16.6% 
Artisan workers and manual qualified workers 17.3% 22.8% 
Conductors of systems, operating of fixed machinery and furniture 8.2% 9.2% 
Unskilled manual workers 6.9% 9.9% 
Military and police forces  0.6% 0.1% 
   
total 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Adapted from City of Modena, Indagine trimestrale sull’occupazione e la disoccupazione a Modena, media 
1999 and (Baldini and Silvestri, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
The “spiral of decay”: how Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta have reacted to global dynamics  
 
Villeneuve-VO as a “sensitive” neighbourhood in Grenoble 
 
As far as Grenoble’s “sensitive” neighbourhoods are concerned, they are mainly 
located in the South of the city (see maps 3 and 4): these are Mistral, Teisseire, Abbaye-
Jouhaux, Villeneuve and Village Olympique (VO). This presentation particularly focuses on 
Villeneuve and VO since they are affected by the municipal “Projet Grenoble Sud”, whose 
main objective is the integration of Villeneuve-VO to the rest of the city, in particular thanks 
to urban renewal. 
 
Village Olympique (VO) is a 6,000-inhabitant neighbourhood. It was built in 1965 in 
the South of Grenoble, in order to accommodate those taking part in the Olympic Winter 
Games organized in 1968. Then, these flats became council flats. Next to VO, there is 
Villeneuve, an 11,000 inhabitant pedestrian district, with a large central park (11 hectares). 
Villeneuve can be divided into two parts (see map 5): the Eastern part, “Baladins-Géants”, 
and the Western part, “Arlequin”. It was built at the beginning of the seventies, as a ZUP 
(Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité, Priority Urbanisation Zone)
2
 (Boyer, 2000: 33). It symbolized 
the social project carried out by the French “municipal socialism” (Frappat, 1979) under the 
local government of the leftist Mayor Hubert Dubedout. The local population participated in 
designing the neighbourhood, which has urban specificities that correspond to the social 
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 ZUP were created in 1958 by the Government who ordered the model of blocks in width. 
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project of living together (“vivre ensemble”) (Joly, 1995). The project planned to mix 
different social classes by mixing in the same block council flats and private ones.  
 
Table 3: Family heads’ professional groups in Villeneuve and Grenoble in the seventies 
 
Professional group (%)  Arlequin (entire 
neighbourhood) 1973 
Arlequin (social 
housing) 
Village 
Olympique 
Grenoble 
1968 
liberal professions and  upper 
management  
16.4 7.2 4.0 11.5 
middle management 23.7 17.8 13.0 12.5 
employees and shopkeepers 17.3 19.5 27.0 17.0 
manual workers and  relative 
workers to services 
24.3 31.5 41.5 31.5 
inactive / students / pensioners  18.3 24.0 14.0 27.5 
families 100 (1657)  100 (953) 100% 100% 
inhabitants 5657 3365   
 
Adapted from Joly (1995: 111, table 2). 
 
Table 3 shows that at the beginning of the seventies, there were, for instance, more 
family heads that belonged to liberal professions and upper management in “Arlequin” than in 
the whole city. The proportion of middle executives was nearly twice higher in Arlequin than 
in Grenoble, and it was the same in VO, which concentrated also a higher proportion of 
employees and shopkeepers. Even social housing in Arlequin was characterised by the same 
proportion of middle executives, employees and shopkeepers, and workers as in the whole 
city. The main architectural characteristic in Villeneuve lies in the “coursives”, that is to say 
long corridors that lead into approximately thirty flats by floor (instead of  two, three or four 
apartments in usual blocks). The general shape of the blocks is quite circular, around the 
central park (see map 5 and the following photos) and the district is a residential and 
pedestrian one. Today, Villeneuve and VO are considered as one and represent the most 
populated district in Grenoble. There are approximately 6,600 flats, 4,200 of them are located 
in Villeneuve and 50% of these 4,200 flats are council ones. 25 % of the council flats are 
located in Baladin-Géants and 75% in Arlequin.  
According to the 1999 national census, 40 different nationalities lived in these two 
neighbourhoods, representing 15% of the district inhabitants (the average is approximately 
10% in the whole city). 57% of the residents were under the age of 34. Crime has increased 
by 22% from 1999 to 2003, whereas it has only increased by 1.4% in the police district of 
Grenoble (that is to say Grenoble plus five smaller close cities) over the same period. In 2003, 
this district concentrated half of all urban violence that had occurred in the police district 
(Direction prévention-sécurité, 2004). The urban configuration of Villeneuve prevents the 
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police from controlling since it’s a pedestrian area, with few car accesses, lots of closed car 
parks, and long “coursives” that allow people to circulate on foot between blocks (see map 5).  
Villeneuve-VO is concerned by different projects, national as well as local, regarding 
employment, urban renewal, education and crime prevention. It was classified as a ZUS (Zone 
Urbaine Sensible, Sensitive Urban Zone) and more particularly a ZRU (Zone de 
Redynamisation Urbaine, Urban Re-vitalization Zone) in 1996 by the national urban renewal 
plan, together with Teisseire-Abbaye-Jouhaux and Mistral.
3
 In 2004, it was also classified as a 
ZFU.
4
 Moreover, the Municipality has been carrying out since 2003 a “Villeneuve-VO crime 
prevention project”, which concerns four sub-districts (Villeneuve, VO, Grand Place (the 
biggest shop centre in Grenoble) and Vigny-Musset). This project is currently both local and 
national since, while the municipality was about to implement a crime prevention project 
dedicated to this district, the Home Minister decided in 2003 to include Villeneuve-VO in its 
crime prevention program which aimed at testing new crime prevention methods in 24 
districts with high crime or urban violence rates. The “Villeneuve-VO crime prevention 
project” represents one aspect of the whole “South Grenoble” project and is therefore partly 
based on residents’ proposals. 
 
Modena’s Crocetta as an old industrial dismissed area 
 
Modena’s Circumscription 2 is composed of three sub-districts: San Lazzaro, Modena 
Est (entirely built in the sixties) and Crocetta, that is to say 46,883 inhabitants. More 
precisely, in 1996 (the year before the Crocetta residents’ mobilization), there were 14.286 
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 These sensitive urban zones (751 currently in France) are characterized by the presence of large housing estates 
and of neighbourhoods of dilapidated buildings, and by a lack of balance between housing and employment. The 
selection of these ZUS was made on the basis of qualitative criteria housing estates”, “lack of 
housing/employment balance and of a joint analysis by the State and elected representatives. They include ZRU 
and ZFU (Zones Franches Urbaines, Urban Free Zones). ZRU are the sensitive urban zones that are faced with 
special difficulties, which can be assessed by their location within the urban area, their economic and 
commercial characteristics, and an integrated index. This index is calculated in accordance with a 1996 decree 
and takes into account the total population of the neighbourhood, the unemployment rate, the proportion of 
young people under the age of 25, the proportion of people who left school without obtaining a certificate, and 
the tax potential of the communes concerned. ZFU are created in neighbourhoods with more than 10,000 
inhabitants that are extremely disadvantaged according to the criteria used to determine urban re-dynamization 
zones. Factors likely to facilitate the establishment of enterprises and the development of economic activities are 
taken into account in ZRU and ZFU: exemption from professional taxes, taxes on benefits,  transfer taxes fur 
purchase of a business, and lowering of social security contributions (in the ZFU: exemption from personal 
social security payments for health/maternity for craftspeople and commercial businesses). This measure of tax 
exemption and exemptions from social security contributions is designed to strengthen economic activity in the 
targeted areas.  
4
 In 2003, the Government decided to add 41 new ZFU to the 44 ones that had been targeted in 1996. 
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residents in the neighbourhood called Crocetta.
5
 This neighbourhood was quite young 
compared to the rest of the circumscription and the rest of the city, since the percentage of 
children under the age of 13 was quite important and that of residents over 65 quite small 
(Chiodi, 1997-1998: 129-130).  
Crocetta became, during the fifties and the sixties, an industrial district, with lots of 
factories –especially along the railway- such as foundries, steelworks, the Fiat area, etc. 
Moreover, since the Third Italy industrial model was based on production decentralization, 
lots of small factories appeared next to these big industrial complexes. Therefore, all these 
factories attracted immigrant workers coming from Southern Italy. As a consequence, this 
area concentrated social housing blocks, especially large ones, built to put up a large number 
of workers and families.  
More recently, the expansion of Modena was supported by the development of the 
tertiary sector. Lots of factories left the Crocetta industrial area, which lost its main function 
and remained with a lot of dismissed areas, which started declining. In 2000, the Municipality 
started an urban renewal project entitled “Qualità urbana, sicurezza, controllo sociale del 
territorio” (“Urban quality, security and social control of the territory), that regarded the 
Northern part of the city, especially dismissed areas along the railway and abandoned 
buildings, such as old foundries, rapes or the livestock market (see maps 7a/ and b/). It is not 
worthwhile recalling that Modena lost 6,000 inhabitants between 1980 and 1995. The decline 
and feeling of abandonment was particularly obvious along the railway, where the biggest 
buildings were concentrated. As a consequence, these abandoned places, marked by physical 
disorders, seem to have followed the dynamic described by Skogan (1990) about American 
neighbourhoods. Moreover, Crocetta was qualified as “l’Altra Modena”, that is to say the “the 
Other Modena” (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 145), or “Città del Nord” (“City of the North”) 
(Bottigelli and Cardia, 2003). This element illustrates the physical gap between this 
neighbourhood, located North of the railway and the railroad, and the rest of the city from 
which it is geographically separated. For instance, there are only three railway bridges and 
they are built for vehicles and not really for pedestrians. As a consequence, the spiral of 
physical decay that regarded specifically this dismissed industrial area finally generated social 
disorders, since some poor migrants started living there and drug dealing started developing. 
Chiodi clearly showed that drug dealing and use, one the one hand, and immigration, on the 
other hand, were the two main problems perceived by the Crocetta’ s residents (1997-1998: 
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 It must be precised that, until 1994, there were 7 circoscrizioni (circumscriptions) in Modena. Crocetta was the 
sixth one and Modena est - San Lazzaro the fifth one.  
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170-183). Besides, a private residential estate -located in a hot spot in Circumscription 2- has 
been targeted since 2004 by a specific urban regeneration project (contratto di quartiere II, 
Neighbourhood Contract II)
6
, since it had been marked by security problems due to illegal 
immigrants concentration, prostitution and drug dealing.  
Actually, Modena’s population started growing after 1995: the net migration increased 
more quickly than the loss of inhabitants. In 1993, 13,000 legal foreign immigrants lived in 
the Province of Modena; which made it the Italian province with the highest rate of 
immigrants. In 1996, circumscription 2 was not more concerned with immigration than the 
rest of the city (immigrants represented 2.75% of the whole district’s population) but it must 
be underlined that it had been marked by a strong past immigration flow from Southern Italy 
(South and Islands) (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 140-141). However, immigration flow has continued 
in this district, as in the whole city. In 2004, there were 8.9% of foreign residents in Modena, 
9.2% in Circumscription 2 but 18.1% in the historical centre (which is twice smaller as the 
other districts in terms of population).  
 
To conclude this short presentation of Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta, we can say that 
they appear to be quite different in terms of population and functions: the former is a recent 
residential and pedestrian area whereas the latter is an industrial dismissed area, mainly 
characterized by physical decay. Nevertheless, it seems that their specific urban configuration 
make them both separated from the rest of the city. If Chiodi, mentioning Chombart de Lauwe 
(1952b), claims that Crocetta can be defined as a “geographic sector”, that is to say a piece of 
territory delimited by physical elements that prevent the neighbourhood from communicating 
with outside, I support that the same diagnosis can be applied to Villeneuve and VO. 
Chombart de Lauwe clearly explained how the geographic distribution of blocks around 
central squares partly lead to make residents live in a separated way from other 
neighbourhoods (Chombart de Lauwe, 1952a: 63). In these two particular neighbourhoods, 
community participation took two different ways: bottom up in Crocetta, since residents 
mobilized to protest again drug dealing, but top down in Villeneuve-VO, where the 
Municipality lead a consultative process to implement their security and crime prevention 
project. 
 
                                               
6
 In 1997, the national Government started financing urban regeneration projects thanks to “Neighbourhood 
Contracts”. Neighbourhood Contracts II belong to the second national urban regeneration policy (which chiefly 
target residential public housing estates) and are mainly financed by the Italian Minister of Public Works. 
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Community participation models in both neighbourhoods: a bottom up logic VS a top down 
one? 
 
Answering inhabitants in Modena: spontaneous mobilisations of citizens’ committees  
 
Before presenting the Modena case, it must be underlined that citizens’ committees 
have appeared in urban areas especially in Northern and Central Italy since the beginning of 
the nineties. Lots of researchers have studied this phenomenon (see Consorzio A.A.S.TER., 
1997 for Milan; Sebastiani, 2001 for Bologna; Selmini, 1997 for Emilia-Romagna). Donatella 
Della Porta supervised then some national research in six cities : Turin, Milan, Bologna, 
Florence, Palermo and Catania (see for instance Allasino et al., 2003 for Turin; Della Porta, 
2004a for final results; Della Porta and Andretta, 2001; 2002; Della Porta and Mosca, 2002; 
Lewanski and Mosca, 2003 for Bologna). It must be added that students also did research on 
that topic (Belluati, 1998; Petrillo, 2000; Poletti, 2002). Lastly, it is important to notice that 
some of these studies have shown to what extent protestations were correlated to the topic of 
immigration (Della Porta, 2000), mentioning violent conflicts between residents and migrants 
(Allasino et al., 2000; Belluati, 1998; Petrillo, 2000). It means that what happened in Modena 
was not an isolated case in Italy. 
 
Modena has been suffering from security problems since the nineties, as the annual 
polls about the feeling of insecurity that the Municipality have carried out since 1996 show it. 
Actually, in December 1995, the local government launched the project called « Modena Città 
Sicura », based on a scientific committee who was in charge of doing research on criminality. 
Knowledge on this topic improved but the situation worsened, until the 1997 violent outburst. 
Actually, the feeling of insecurity in Modena started decreasing in 1999 (Comune di Modena, 
2003). 
The first citizens’ committee in Modena was born in 1992 to fight against prostitution 
(Comitato Fiera). Then, other committees emerged, especially to protest against drug dealing 
(Comitato San Cataldo, Comitato Sacca, Comitato Terranova), but not especially in the 
Circumscription 2. Annual polls about the feeling of insecurity had also underlined that drugs, 
prostitution and immigration were the three main elements considered as risky by the local 
population (Comune di Modena, 2003: 18). 
On June 1997, the citizens’ committee coordination organized in Crocetta a torchlight 
procession that gathered 2000 people, who walked through all the hot spots of the 
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neighbourhood. At the same period, one of the citizens’ committees promoted a petition 
calling for law enforcement towards illegal immigration (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 189-191). 
Between June and September, this petition was signed by 18,476 people, that is to say more 
than 10% of the whole population of Modena. The local government and the Region Emilia-
Romagna were asked to support the proposal and they brought it to Parliament in February 
1998, therefore giving birth to the immigration law called « Turco-Napolitano ». This law was 
far more restrictive as regarded illegal immigrants and delinquent foreigners. In particular, it 
created CPT (“Centri di Permanenza Temporanea”, Temporaneous-Stay Centers) for 
delinquent foreigners. Actually, one of the problems pointed out by citizens’ committees was 
the lack of holding back structures for illegal immigrant who had committed crime and had to 
be sent back to their country: their were let free until their expulsion. After the law was 
passed, citizens’ committees asked for and obtained the building of one of the CPT for 
delinquent foreigners. It is all the more interesting to notice since only eight centres were built 
in Italy, and only in regional capitals (Modena is only a provincial capital).  
Moreover, during the summer 1997, some Crocetta’s social housing residents started 
foot patrolling by night to prevent street pushers from acting. At the end of August, some of 
them committed violence against some immigrant drug dealers. It’s interesting to bear in 
mind that in 1991, a poll had already revealed that 75% of the inhabitants claimed that 
criminality had increased in Modena because of  immigrants (Franchini and Guidi, 1991). 
Local newspapers spoke of a genuine “drug dealers hunt”, lead by residents armed with bars 
and sticks. Chiodi’s interviews with some residents (for her study on immigration and 
insecurity in Crocetta) confirmed that some episodes of violence had really occurred (1997-
1998: 190). These violent events immediately generated a reaction from local authorities and 
the day after, a police unity was sent in Crocetta. A month later, the situation had improved.   
 
In this context, the Mayor had to cope with the citizens’ protest and chose to show 
voluntarism, suggesting a partnership between the State and the local government in the field 
of security and signing in 1998 the first “ protocollo d’intesa” (“agreement protocol”) 
regarding urban security. Moreover, some committee members were invited to CPOSP 
(Comitato Provinciale per l’Ordine e la Sicurezza Pubblica, Provincial Committee for Order 
and Public security) meetings by the Prefect
7
, in order to expose their problems to public 
authorities. The Mayor also gave a boost to a real local security policy. One of the aspects of 
                                               
7
 The prefect is the head of the national bureaucracies operating at the level of the province in Italy. 
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this policy lied in community participation, since an “informal neighbourhood watch 
structure” was implemented by the Municipality (Poletti, 2005). Actually, some committee 
members voluntarily kept a close eye on their neighbourhood, particularly on specific hot 
spots in the city, and completed forms, putting down as much information as possible about 
potential suspects. Forms were then passed on to those in charge, who picked out the most 
useful information for the Police. These “sentinelles” (Poletti, 2002) were chiefly recruited 
among shopkeepers and old pensioners and kept constant contacts with the Municipal Police, 
but also the Prefect and the Questore (Police Superintendent). Moreover, the Municipal 
Police’s way to work was completely reorganized according to a community policing 
orientation. In 1995, the Municipality had already launched the project « Vigile di quartiere » 
(Neighbourhood policemen) : municipal police agents had to reinsure the local population by  
foot patrolling. In 1999, some specific paths were defined in neighbourhoods in order to 
strenghten contacts between these municipal police agents and some local actors such as 
Circumscriptions’ chairmen, volunteers, associations, and citizens. Since 2001, some « agenti 
di quartiere » (neighbourhood agents) have been monitoring the territory according to the 
guidelines of the problem-solving approach, since they have to look at problems in a 
proactive way and then to solve them (by making other municipal services intervene for 
instance).Their method of work is based on five stages: defining problems; finding solutions; 
involving inhabitants, who are in charge of calling attention to soft crimes or suspect events 
and then help finding solutions; short-term assessment with inhabitants; long-term assessment 
(Rondinone, 2004: 116-117). 
 
Involving inhabitants in Grenoble: the top down process of the “Projet Grenoble Sud” 
 
This kind of community participation results from a top down process, driven by the 
local government who lead a consultative process that enabled people to make proposals to 
improve the quality of life in their district, and then to maintain control over the effective 
implementation of the retained proposals. This mode of community participation can be 
qualified as “program-building and implementation-controlling”, since residents participate in 
the definition of the municipal project by making proposals, but they also check the 
implementation of the plan. However, this mode of participation is only consultative since the 
Municipality is not constrained by the residents’ orientations. 
Four districts are concerned by the “Projet Grenoble Sud”  -Villeneuve, VO, Vigny-
Musset and Malherbe- that is to say more than 52,000 inhabitants, but the main objective lies 
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in the integration of Villeneuve to the rest of the city, in particular thanks to urban renewal. 
The project was launched in 2003 and implied community participation through processes of 
dialogue with residents. It means, on the one hand, that different kinds of meetings with 
residents were organized by the local government and, on the other hand, that some 
volunteers participated in the reflection about the future of their own district, making 
proposals to improve their quality of life. Indeed, there were two public information meetings 
in April and June 2004; five meetings, from November 2003 to June 2004, with the two CCS 
(“Conseils Consultatifs de Secteurs”, Neighbourhood Consultative Councils)
8
 concerned by 
the urban renewal project; and eight information meetings and discussion meetings in June-
July 2004. 
The dialogue process was carried out through five stages. From June to July 2003, 550 
people were contacted by the Municipality and 120 of them accepted to be interviewed. A 40 
minute film was made to introduce public meetings. Then, in September 2003, 1200 people 
participated in three public meetings; 200 of them were registered as volunteers to participate 
in workshops. Four topics were chosen for these workshops: “security”, “young people”, 
“urban development and planning”, “living together” (“vivre ensemble”). In October 2003, 
140 residents participated in two sessions and made 269 real proposals. From September to 
October, municipal officials and services worked on these proposals and 74 were picked up. 
They mainly regarded five themes: urban cleanliness, crime prevention and victim support, 
health, education and employment, urban opening-up. Lastly, in November 2003, during a 
public meeting, the Mayor claimed to support the creation of an “observatoire des 
engagements” (“commitment observatory”), that is to say that some residents would get 
voluntarily involved in the assessment of the local government action. 50 residents are still 
currently supervising the project implementation. In 2004, they wrote a 47 page report, 
putting down their assessment of the project implementation, making criticisms and proposals 
to improve the project. 
The “South Grenoble” consultative process has obviously met with classical 
difficulties as regards this kind of participative project, such as the lack of participation of 
young people, for instance. Besides, it must be pointed out that 1,200 people participated in 
that is to say hardly more than 2% of the local residents concerned by the project. Security is 
                                               
8
 CCS were created in 2002 in all big cities after the law on “Démocratie de proximité” generalizing 
“neighbourhoods committees”  was passed. They are consultative structures, composed of inhabitants, and co-
chaired by a deputy mayor and a resident. There are six CCS in Grenoble, corresponding to the six 
administrative sectors defined by the Municipality. The CCS 6 is composed of Villeneuve, VO, Malherbe and 
Vigny-Musset. 
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a key issue in the “South Grenoble” project because we can notice a growing concentration of 
deprived people in this area. So what is at stake in this district is to maintain “social mixity”, 
and security is one of the basic conditions of success. 
 
 
Indeed, it can be said that the two municipal logics of community involvement seem to 
be quite unallike. Whereas in Grenoble, the consultative process has been precisely defined 
by the Municipality, citizens seem to have imposed their preoccupation to the local 
government in Modena. How this difference can be explained? Why inhabitants mobilized in 
Modena, forcing the Municipality to become responsible for security problems, and not in 
Grenoble, where the Municipality led on their own a consultative process? The three 
following sections try to bring some answers.  
 
 
2.  First set of hypothesis: socio-economic status, physical aspects and feeling of 
insecurity as key explanatory factors for mobilizations 
 
 
Before going further, it is necessary to examine if there were or not “events of 
protest”
9
 in Villeneuve-VO as regarded security topics. A review of the local press (i.e. Le 
Dauphiné Libéré, the single local newspaper in Grenoble) over a fifteen year period (1991-
2005) only revealed 12 events of protest (such as petitions or marches). For instance, on 
January 1998, between 150 and 200 residents gathered to protest against violence after the 
Arlequin’s barber had been attacked
10
. The local newspaper also mentioned in April 1998 that 
a citizens’ committee entitled “La délinquance, ça suffit” (“Crime, that’s enough!”) was born 
to help residents reporting complaints to the Police.
11
 So collective action seems less diffused 
than in Modena, where, as mentioned earlier, there were strong mobilizations in 1997 in 
Crocetta, but also in 1998-1999, when shopkeeper federations led striking press campaigns 
for law enforcement and allied to citizens’ committees to protest. Some events of protest 
regarding security also occurred in other Italian cities, as Della Porta’s research on citizens’ 
                                               
9
 I use the same definition of “events of protest” as did for instance Allasino et al. (2003), i.e. all the action forms 
used by citizens’ groups.  
10
 Le Dauphiné Libéré, 11.01.98. 
11
 Le Dauphiné Libéré, 15.04.98. 
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committees clearly showed (Della Porta, 2004a: chapter 3). For instance, Lewanski and 
Mosca (2003) accounted for 29 events of protest in Bologna in 1991, and 62 in 2000.  
Several sets of hypotheses can be then mobilized to explain this mobilization 
differential. The first one is that there is no social demand for security in Villeneuve-VO. It is 
not very likely since the Municipality has built a crime prevention project for this area in 
particular and since, as I’ll show it in the first section, the feeling of insecurity is higher in this 
area than in the rest of the city. 
The second hypothesis is that the number of events of protest is as high in Villeneuve-
VO as in Crocetta –or at least that there are some collective actions in Villeneuve- but the 
media threshold is higher. It would mean that it is more difficult for events of protest to cross 
the local media threshold in Grenoble than in Modena. The lack of local press pluralism in 
France in general could be an explanatory element: it could set bounds to security media 
coverage, since security has always been a critical topic. I think that this element is quite true 
since some researchers have shown that media represent a strong constraint for public 
authorities, who seek to avoid leaks of information or public criticisms as far as security 
policies are concerned (Gatto and Thoenig, 1993; Thoenig, 1994). It can be hypothesized that, 
since the Mayor is henceforth involved in the security co-production, he has to conform to 
these discretion rules. Moreover, as it’s in the Mayor and the (single) local newspaper’s 
interest to avoid conflicts, it is not impossible that the local specific configuration in Grenoble 
prevents the local newspaper from giving media coverage to some events of protest.  
However, as the urban violence events that occurred in last November in France 
showed it, the local newspaper in Grenoble can’t avoid mentioning so important events. As a 
consequence, it can be imagined that, if there were very important citizens’ mobilizations and 
protests, they would be covered by local media.  
So this point brings me to my third hypothesis: the number of events of protest is 
really lower in Grenoble than in Modena and this differential has to be explored. Is the 
security demand really lower in Grenoble? I claim that the top down community involvement 
process is the Municipality’s answer to the local security demand in Villeneuve-VO. So, in 
the next section, I examine the security demand levels in both areas, to determine if there is an 
existing demand. If we consider collective action as a form of expression of the local security 
demand, it could be first hypothesized that it is stronger in Crocetta than in Villeneuve, which 
could explain why residents mobilized in Crocetta and not in Villeneuve. To check this 
hypothesis, I compare in the next section the results of some polls about the feeling of 
insecurity, carried out in both neighbourhoods.  
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Feeling of insecurity in both neighbourhoods 
 
In Modena, an annual poll has been carried out since 1996 to assess the feeling of 
insecurity in the four districts
12
. In 1996, 28.7% of the Circumscription 2 considered crime as 
a quite or very serious problem in their residence area (the average was 24.8% in Modena), 
but in 1997, they were 42%, whereas the average was 28.7% in the whole city. So, Crocetta’s 
inhabitants clearly felt more unsafe than their neighbours, all the more as the percentage of 
inhabitants considering their own city as quite or very unsafe decreased between 1996 and 
1997, from 55.1% to 43.7%. Moreover, the general opinion about the neighbourhood 
radically changed in 1997: whereas in 1996, 45.8% of the inhabitants considered the centre as 
the most unsafe neighbourhood in the city (and only 17.3% for Crocetta-San Lazzaro), in 
1997, 44% mentioned Crocetta-San Lazzaro and only 26.3% the centre. Besides, 49.5% of the 
Circumscription 2’s residents considered crime as a more serious problem in their residence 
district than in other ones, whereas the city average was 31.2% (Roversi, 1997: 79, table 7). A 
specific area, Sacca, located in the Circumscription 2, was considered as particularly unsafe, 
since in 1997, 85.4% of those who considered Crocetta-San Lazzaro as the most unsafe 
neighbourhood mentioned this specific area (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 92). Drug dealing and use 
were the two main phenomena that generated preoccupation among residents, reaching the 
first rank of preoccupations. The last element to notice is that the people interviewed 
considered drug addicts, gypsies and immigrants as those who committed crime in their 
district (Roversi, 1997: 95).  
In Villeneuve, the feeling of insecurity is also higher than in the rest of the city. In 
2005, 31.3 % of the local residents claimed to feel insecure in their own district; they were 
20.4% in Grenoble (CERDAP-PACTE, 2005: 8). The academic poll made in 2005 clearly 
showed that the Villeneuve-VO residents felt more concerned by physical and verbal violence 
than the rest of the population, but the victimization rate was not higher than in the rest of the 
city. Moreover, some municipal officials have pointed out that the fact that some notorious 
delinquents live in the neighbourhood, which frightens some residents and prevents them 
from reporting them to the police, or even consulting public authorities such as housing 
authorities or the Municipality. So, individual and collective actions are all the more uneasy 
                                               
12
 All the following data come from the 1997 report Lo stato della sicurezza a Modena. 
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as local residents are often afraid of reprisals in Villeneuve-VO
13
 whereas Chiodi’s research 
(1997-1998) or Poletti’s one (2002) on citizens’ committees in Modena didn’t mention this 
element.  
 
 
These few data bring me to conclude that the feeling of safety seems relatively 
diffused in Villeneuve-VO and in Crocetta compared to the rest of the city in both cases. It 
means that a social security demand –defined as the expression of the feeling of insecurity 
(Roché, 1998b)- also exists in Villeneuve-VO. Obviously, this conclusion is far from being 
new: the Municipality would have probably not built a crime prevention project focussed on 
this district if there would have not been a security demand.  
In the next section, I examine the socio-economic characteristics of the two 
neighbourhoods in Grenoble and Modena to assess if they can help to explain the 
mobilization differential. As far as “social capital” is concerned, I do not discuss the different 
meanings of the notion, since other researchers have already done it (Almagisti and Messina, 
2005; Bagnasco et al., 2001; Gatti et al., 2002) and consider it as a component of political 
culture. I lack statistical data to assess the level of social capital in both neighbourhoods for 
the moment, so I only use levels of political participation to draw a first idea. In addition, it 
would have also been interesting to check the level of trust towards institutions in both 
neighbourhoods in order to check Roché’s hypothesis about the retraction phenomenon. Even 
if I am not able to present the same indicators in both cities, those that are available in each of 
them allow me to say that Crocetta seems more socially homogeneous and economically 
wealthy than Villeneuve.  
 
Crocetta as a more economically and socially homogeneous neighbourhood than 
Villeneuve 
 
Some researchers have noticed that the Durkheimian thesis about the social integration 
function of crime is still true, but depends on inhabitants’ socio-economic status, since 
advantaged classes can mobilize more easily (Barbagli, 1999: 23-24; Della Porta, 2004b; 
Roché, 1998b: 138-142; 2000). A correlation can often be found between socio-economic 
status, which partly defines vulnerability, and feeling of insecurity (Roché, 1998a). Choffel 
                                               
13
 Interview with two municipal crime prevention office’s members, November 2004. 
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(1996), worked on the 1995 Insee poll about insecurity and revealed that people who lived in 
districts concerned by urban policies were those with the highest feeling of insecurity : only 
66% of these residents felt secure whereas they were 80.7% in the whole urban area and 
86.2% in France. In Italy, Barbagli (1998b) also pointed out that people who felt unsafe more 
often belonged to deprived classes, such as workers, unemployed people or low qualified 
people. For instance, Roché (2000) underlined that in Romans, 20% of the owner-occupiers 
alerted the municipality about disorders, whereas the city average was 11%. He also found 
that in Saint-Etienne, among all the employed, less than 5% of the workers mentioned that 
they had complained to the Municipality, whereas 10% of intermediate professions had.  
Table 4 clearly shows that the average income in Crocetta (21,971 euros 2002) is as 
high as in the rest of the city (22,198 euros 2002).  
 
 
Table 4: Average income in Modena’s circumscriptions (euros 2002) 
 
  Euros  Italy = 100  Northern East = 100  Modena=100 
         
Modena  22,198  149    100 
          
1 Centro storico  21,521      97 
2 Crocetta  21,971      99 
3 Buon Pastore  22,796      103 
4 San Faustino  21,886      99 
         
Province  20,414  137  110   
         
Northern East Italy  18,593    100   
         
Italy  14,939  100     
 
Adapted from Baldini and Silvestri (2003). 
 
Graph 1: Family heads’ professional groups in Villeneuve and Grenoble (Insee, 1999) 
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Artisans, 
shopkeepers 
and managers 
Executives 
and 
intellectual 
professions 
Intermediate 
professions 
employees 
manual 
workers 
pensioners inactive 
        
Villeneuve 2% 12% 18% 19% 21% 17% 11% 
        
Grenoble 3% 14% 15% 12% 11% 24% 20% 
 
Adapted from Filou et al. (2003: 22) 
 
On the opposite, Villeneuve-VO appears as more economically deprived than the rest 
of the city. Indeed, whereas, the average unemployment rate was 16% in Grenoble in 2001, it 
was about 24% in Villeneuve -reaching 34% in “Arlequin”- and 27.8% in VO. Moreover, the 
crime prevention and security office has underlined that a growing concentration of deprived 
people could be noticed in this area, even in private residential estates. Indeed, more and more 
private residential owners tend to rent their apartments (Filou et al., 2003). Nevertheless, if 
the rate of workers is twice higher than in Grenoble, there the percentage of managerial 
professions and intermediate professions is slightly lower than in the entire city (see graph 1), 
but with a lot of disparities as regards residential estates. It means that “social mixity”, even if 
quickly decreasing, still seems to exist in Villeneuve-VO.   
 
It must be recalled that Modena belongs to the Region Emilia-Romagna, i.e. the most 
“civic” region in Italy according to Putnam’s famous study (1993). Even if this study’s results 
have been put into perspective (Barbagli and Colombo, 2004), it can’t be denied that rates of 
political and social participation remain higher in this region than the Italian average 
(Barbagli and Colombo, 2004: 25-56). As I have already mentioned, I only examine political 
participation rates in this section since I lack other comparative statistical data. 
Political participation rates in Modena remain very high. It was 87.9% for the 1995 
municipal election and 79.1% for the 1999 municipal election. In 2001, it reached 90.0% for 
the legislative election. Even for the last abrogative referendum, in June 2005, the 
participation rate reached 46.2% in Modena, whereas the Italian average was only 25.9%.  
Even if I lack statistical data over a long period, I have tried to examine the political 
participation rate to different elections to determine if Villeneuve-VO was less “civic” than 
other neighbourhoods (see tables 5). Indeed, except Baladins, whose participation rate is often 
close to the city average (even if slightly lower), Arlequin and VO are often clearly under the 
city average (and so are Mistral and Teisseire-Abbaye, the two other sensitive 
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neighbourhoods classified as ZUS). Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that during the 
2002 presidential election, which saw the National Front candidate present at the second 
ballot, it is in these neighbourhoods that the participation rate increased most. So, if these 
neighbourhoods are slightly less “civic” than others, they are not the “worst”. 
 
 
Tables 5: Political participation rates in Grenoble  
 
Table 5a - Municipal elections 2001 – participation rate in neighbourhoods  
 
 
1
st
 ballot (%) 2
nd
 ballot (%) 
 
Grenoble 53.06 56.35 
   
Clémenceau  52.77 52.2 
Vieux temple 57.57 59.66 
Ile Verte 56.98 60.91 
Saint Laurent 59.18 64.36 
Abbaye 51.02 56.2 
Taillefer 46.83 51.11 
Teisseire 45.36 49.23 
Jardin de ville 55.64 59.32 
Berlioz 57.71 59.88 
Porte de France  52.03 58.13 
Hoche 53.29 57.19 
Capuche 54.65 58.44 
Malherbe 56.62 60.35 
Baladins 56.17 56.88 
Alphonse Daudet 50.66 53.73 
Sidi Brahim 54.57 57.29 
Jean Jaurès 53.51 55.31 
Boissieux 54.19 57.64 
Elisée Chatin 52.83 56.98 
Berriat 52.10 53.79 
Claude Bernard 54.81 56.28 
Joseph Vallier 49.85 53.93 
Eaux Claires 52.50 57.38 
Arlequin 49.93 53.51 
Village Olympique  47.28 49.29 
Beauvert 51.76 53.41 
André Abry 49.66 51.95 
Anatole France (Mistral) 43.78 48.81 
Houille Blanche 55.70 59.68 
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Table 5b - Legislative elections in 2002 – participation rate in neighbourhoods  
 
 
 1st ballot (%) 2
nd
 
 
 ballot (%) 
   
circumscription  66.26 61.29 
   
Clémenceau  64.54 59.15 
Vieux temple 70.49 64.94 
Ile Verte 70.31 65.65 
Saint Laurent 69.93 65.43 
Abbaye 61.8 56.83 
Taillefer 58.19 52.56 
Teisseire 51.02 46.06 
Jardin de ville 70.5 64.98 
Berlioz 70.93 66.26 
Porte de France  65.57 59.62 
Hoche 65.21 60.35 
Capuche 66.85 62.81 
   
circumscription 64.29 57.81 
   
Malherbe 66.34 60.35 
Baladins 64.07 56.74 
Alphonse Daudet 60.06 56.13 
Sidi Brahim 65.65 59.41 
Jean Jaurès 67.5 62.11 
Boissieux 66.67 62.51 
Elisée Chatin 65.56 59.79 
Berriat 66.94 57.83 
Claude Bernard 68.36 61.0 
Joseph Vallier 64.66 57.77 
Eaux Claires 65.13 58.83 
Arlequin 60.32 55.22 
Village Olympique  56.98 51.22 
Beauvert 63.11 57.67 
André Abry 60.05 53.08 
Anatole France (Mistral) 59.67 53.14 
Houille Blanche 67.18 63.59 
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Table 5c - Presidential election 2002 – participation rate in neighbourhoods  
 
 
 1st ballot 
(%) 
2
nd
 ballot 
(%) 
mobilization between the two 
ballots 
    
Grenoble 72.61 80.23 +7.6 
    
Clémenceau  72.06 79.66 +7.6 
Vieux temple 76.03 83.12 +7.1 
Ile Verte 75.19 82.59 +7.4 
Saint Laurent 72.04 80.0 +8 
Abbaye 71.44 79.22 +7.8 
Taillefer 68.0 77.17 +9.1 
Teisseire 62.89 73.81 +11 
Jardin de ville 74.66 82.34 +7.7 
Berlioz 74.92 82.02 +7.1 
Porte de France  74.44 81.38 +6.9 
Hoche 72.56 79.67 +7.1 
Capuche 73.94 81.14 +7.2 
Malherbe 74.64 81.71 +7.1 
Baladins 72.32 82.79 +10.4 
Alphonse Daudet 71.07 77.88 +6.7 
Sidi Brahim 74.01 81.65 +7.6 
Jean Jaurès 72.87 78.38 +5.5 
Boissieux 72.59 79.91 +7.4 
Elisée Chatin 72.52 78.45 +5.9 
Berriat 73.23 81.08 +7.8 
Claude Bernard 74.69 79.93 +5.3 
Joseph Vallier 72.03 78.95 +6.9 
Eaux Claires 73.39 81.52 +8.2 
Arlequin 68.19 79.19 +11 
Village Olympique  66.3 77.72 +11.4 
Beauvert 75.13 80.05 +4.9 
André Abry 68.64 77.33 +8.7 
Anatole France 
(Mistral) 
67.35 76.2 +8.9 
Houille Blanche 75.46 81.72 +6.3 
 
 
As a conclusion, we can say that the socio-economic status of Villeneuve-VO’s 
residents seems less homogeneous than in Crocetta. This element can partly explain why 
collective action seems far less frequent in the former. Moreover, the particular 
neighbourhoods’ physical configuration can have an influence on residents’ collective action 
abilities. Indeed, I have already mentioned that both neighbourhoods are quite separated from 
the rest of the city. Villeneuve, in particular, is a circular pedestrian area, with only four car 
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accesses, and Crocetta is geographically excluded because of the railway and the railroad. The 
urban configuration of these two neighbourhoods is quite different, and so are the 
consequences on crime and disorders and therefore on the residents’ abilities to act 
collectively. 
 
Neighbourhoods’ urban configuration as an additive factor 
 
In both neighbourhoods, the problem mainly lies in the control of the territory. 
Crocetta, as an industrial dismissed area, suffers from the decay of old factories and buildings, 
occupied by new visible delinquents, stigmatized by the local residents. Indeed, some 
Crocetta’s residents evoked the need to re-conquest their neighbourhood against street 
pushers and underlined that they were partly responsible for the situation since they had not 
reacted before because of fear (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 236-245). In France, the current Home 
Minister -following some studies made by “security experts” and policemen (see for instance 
Bauer and Raufer, 1998; Bousquet, 1998; Bui-Trong, 1998)- claims that one of the most 
diffused phenomena in French “sensitive” neighbourhoods is probably the “économie 
souterraine” (black economy), often based on drug trafficking. The Home Minister decided in 
2002 to create specific inter-force police groups (GIR, Groupes d’Intervention Régionaux, 
Intervention Regional Groups) in charge of fighting against the black economy and all forms 
of organized criminality anchored in those deprived neighbourhoods that are henceforth 
controlled by local small groups of delinquents. Villeneuve is also concerned by drug 
problems: in 2000, the murder of a sixteen-year-old resident by two friends of his strikingly 
put light on the situation. So, it can be said that drug dealing was a common problematic for 
Crocetta and Villeneuve. But the Villeneuve’s urban configuration has favoured the territory’s 
appropriation by some delinquents, especially because of the lack of car accesses, which has 
prevented the police from coming in this neighbourhood. Besides, the circular form of the 
blocks and the “coursives” allow delinquents to disappear easily when the Police arrive and 
all the more quickly as they are often warned by other residents of the Police’s arrival.
14
 To 
sum up, the intervention of the police was physically possible in Crocetta, but more uneasy in 
Villeneuve. These physical elements must be underlined since, as Roché explained, the more 
people are faced with disorders, the less they trust the police (2000). If the police can’t 
intervene, they aren’t able to stop the decay process that Roché has called the “disorders 
                                               
14
 Interview with the Municipal Police Manager and the Villeneuve-VO Unit Chief, January 2006. 
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triangle”. On the opposite, it can be hypothesized that in Crocetta, the police intervention has 
interrupted this vicious circle.  
 
 
 
So, in this section, I have tried to show that in both neighbourhoods, even if there was 
a social security demand, citizens’ mobilizations were more uneasy in Villeneuve-VO since it 
was a more economically and socially heterogeneous neighbourhood than Crocetta. And it is 
known that the feeling of insecurity can help people to join forces, but only advantaged 
classes. Moreover, the urban characteristics strongly influenced the deviants and delinquents’ 
abilities to control the territory, since they partly determined the police abilities to intervene. 
This element had some consequences on the local residents’ feeling of insecurity and abilities 
to consult public authorities. So, these factors help to understand the mobilization differential 
between the two neighbourhoods in France and Italy. Nevertheless, if these elements can help 
to understand why citizens’ mobilizations are quite uneasy in Villeneuve-VO, they don’t tell 
us how the local security demand is expressed. As a consequence, other hypotheses are 
needed.  
 
 
3. Second set of hypothesis: political culture and institutional mediation channels  
 
 
In this section, I suggest the idea that the local security demand is more institutionally 
channelled in Grenoble than in Modena. The first hypothesis I have made is that the security 
demand was expressed by voting, i.e. that the vote for the National Front was quite diffused in 
Villeneuve-VO. The analysis of the last municipal elections in Grenoble lead me to infirm 
this hypothesis since -as I’ll show it in the first paragraph- the vote for the National Front in 
Villeneuve-Vo was lower than the city average.  Moreover, as far as security media coverage 
is concerned, the 2001 municipal election in Grenoble seems to be a case in point, since 
security appeared as an invisible electoral stake: neither candidates nor newspapers talked 
much about it. It’s necessary to recall that Le Dauphiné Libéré has never related many events 
of protest in Grenoble, as already mentioned, whereas in Modena, the Mayor was placed 
under a strong media pressure. Nevertheless, over the last fifteen years, it has often reported 
local meetings during which security problems were tackled (districts committees meetings, 
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shopkeepers meetings, information meetings organized by the Municipality, etc.). Indeed, the 
high number of associations rooted in Villeneuve-VO has already be mentioned. There are 
also a lot of historical local democracy structures in the city, which probably play a role in 
channelling the security demand, as they do in Marseille, for instance (Le Naour, 2005). On 
the opposite, in her study about immigration and insecurity in Crocetta, Chiodi (1997-1998: 
237-245) reported some inhabitants’ interviews in which they said they had felt abandoned by 
the local authorities, who had only reacted once the violent events had occurred.  
So, these indications lead me to support the idea that the local security demand is more 
channelled by the municipality in Grenoble than in Modena. Local and national political and 
historical events can be considered as key explanatory factors. The political history of 
Grenoble –and the municipal Socialism’s heritage- can help understanding why such local 
democracy structures are rooted in the city, whereas in Modena -and more generally speaking, 
in Italy- the political party local structures, that used to play this mediation role, disappeared 
with the national political crisis that caused the end of the First Republic. In Italy, Mayors 
suddenly had to cope with demands they were not used to deal with, especially after the 1993 
electoral reform that set out their direct election by citizens, whereas in France, where their 
territorial legitimacy was older, as well as their mediation function, they had their own 
mediation channels.  
 
First hypothesis: Expressing security demand by voting for far- right political parties  
 
The vote for extremist political parties could be an alternative way of asking for 
security. In France, the National Front has used security (and immigration) topics as electoral 
issues for 25 years (Mayer, 2002). Moreover, thanks to empirical data, Roché (2000) pointed 
out that National Front supporters felt more sensitive than others to voluntarily burnt cars and 
as sensitive as right wing supporters as regards the moral condemnation of thefts for instance. 
However, the proportion of National Front supporters who had reported drug problems in 
their neighbourhood was the same as that of left wing supporters. Roché checked that the 
statistical relations he had found between fear of crime and presence of disorders were 
independent on age, gender and political orientation. As far as our topic is concerned, it can 
be deduced that people vote for National Front to express preoccupations towards security. 
So, it can be hypothesized that, as the security demand is expressed by mobilizations 
in Crocetta, the vote for right extremist parties is quite low; whereas in Villeneuve-VO -where 
it can be admitted that a large part of inhabitants have voted with their feet, leaving the 
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district- the local residents could vote for the National Front to express protest. Indeed, in 
Modena, during the 1995 municipal election, the Northern League candidate only won 3.4% 
of the votes (and the list 3.5%). In 1999, he won 2.9% and the list 2.9% too. In 
Circumscription 2, in 1995 and in 1999, there was no Northern League list for the 
circumscription election. However, it is not worthwhile underlining that in 1999, in the First 
Circumscription (historical centre), the centre-right wing won 11 polling stations out of 20 
and a centre-right chairman was elected by the circumscription council. It can be thought that 
the Mayor considered this element as a serious electoral warning, even if he was elected at the 
first ballot and that DS (Democratici di Sinistra, Left Democrats), with more than 40% of the 
votes, undoubtedly became the first political party in the municipal council. 
 
 As far as Grenoble is concerned, let’s have a look on the 2001 municipal election and 
the 2002 presidential one. In 2001, the National Front list won 7.2% of the vote at the first 
ballot (8.21% in 1995). The National Front only won 5.08% in Arlequin, 6.09% in Baladins 
and 7.70% in VO, but more than the average in Mistral (11.14%) or Teisseire (9.06%) for 
instance. It’s interesting to point out that in 1995, the political party won 10.5% in VO, which 
could mean that the security demand expressed by vote decreased between 1995 and 2001 in 
VO, even if the vote for the National Front is always slightly over the average. 
 It is unnecessary to recall that the 2002 presidential election was a strong shock in 
France since the National Front candidate managed to enter the second ballot. At the first 
ballot, Jean-Marie Le Pen won 12.48% of the votes in Grenoble, but only 8.22% in Baladins, 
7.77% in Arlequin and 12.67% in VO, that is to say that the vote for the National Front in 
these neighbourhoods was below or the same as the city average. Moreover, at the second 
ballot, he was definitely under the city average (12.15%), since he won 8.12% in Baladins, 
8.29% in Arlequin and 10.95% in VO. 
 
The presentation of these electoral results in both neighbourhoods clearly shows that 
far-right political parties don’t catch more votes in these areas than in the rest of the city. 
More precisely, these neighbourhoods seem reluctant to vote for far-right political parties. So, 
it means that the security demand in Villeneuve-VO is expressed in a different way from far-
right vote and mobilization. A second hypothesis is therefore needed.  
What is interesting to notice is that crime didn’t seem to be an electoral stake in 
Grenoble - unlike numerous other French cities- as illustrated by the small number of press 
articles dealing with that topic. However, a pre-electoral poll, carried out in February 2001 in 
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Grenoble, revealed that security was the main stake for voters (30%), immediately followed 
by employment (27%). It suggests that, even if security didn’t seem much publicized in local 
media, it was a real stake. It has just been said that the National Front didn’t win many votes 
in Villeneuve-VO in 2001. Indeed, the neighbourhood has always tended to vote more left 
than right. In 2001, the left wing Mayor obtained 82% of the votes in Arlequin (Villeneuve), 
80.6% in Baladins (Villeneuve), and 67.6% in VO, whereas he was re-elected with only 51% 
of the votes (for more details see Martin, 2002). Indeed, the Mayor only won with an 850-
vote gap, so the 1166 votes he won in Arlequin and the 1151 ones in Baladins had a great 
importance: it can be said that the left wing Mayor was re-elected partly thanks to the massive 
support of Villeneuve’s voters.  
These two elements lead me to draw two hypotheses. First, the absence of security 
media coverage –whereas it was an effective electoral stake- could mean that the strong 
institutional channelling of security problems in Grenoble makes citizens’mobilization 
unnecessary. It’s interesting to bear in mind that in Modena, the publicization of the was one 
of the main strategies chosen by citizens’ committees, who organized press conferences and 
campaigns. Second, since Villeneuve-VO voters strongly supported the left wing Mayor and 
helped making him being re-elected, it can be supposed that the municipal crime prevention 
project was in fact the Mayor’s answer to his electorate’s security demand. How did the 
Mayor hear this security demand? 
 
Second hypothesis: Municipal channelling of the local security demand 
 
Municipal Socialism’s legacy in Grenoble and local democracy structures 
 
Grenoble was as important for the French municipal Socialism in France as Bologna 
was for the Italian Communist Party. Indeed, the whole city has been the symbol of the 
participatory democratic project for twenty years.  
Grenoble was already famous in terms of local democracy structures, since the first 
UQ (Union de Quartiers, Neighbourhoods Union) –that is to say districts committees- was 
born there in 1921. In 1961, there were 21 “UQ” in the city, so that a UQ co-ordination 
committee was created, to co-ordinate them. More generally speaking, there was an increase 
of associations in Grenoble during the sixties, which was due to the strong demographic 
growth, partly based on a strong dynamic of immigration. Indeed, from 1954 to 1962, the city  
population increased by 37%, from 116,400 to 159,329 inhabitants (Joly, 1995: 28) and its 
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sociological composition changed a lot with the arrival of upper executives - engineers  and 
intellectual professions in particular- and middle executives. 
The GAM (Groupe d’Action Municipale, Municipal Action Group) emerged in 
Grenoble1964 on the UQ basis (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997). It was, at the beginning, a 
local and apolitical inhabitants’ mobilization against urban discomfort (Joly, 1995: 31). The 
origins of the movement lie in the protest of a young engineer, Hubert Dubedout, who 
complained about the problems of water provision in his bathroom and then created the GAM 
in 1965. More generally speaking, the GAM appeared in dynamic French cities, such as 
Grenoble, which were in expansion from an economic and demographic point of view. They 
were composed of quite young and wealthy people, especially upper and middle executives, 
liberal professions and intermediary professions (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997: 298; 
Joly, 1995: 27-28) and embodied what would be called today “civil society”. 
In 1965, for the municipal election, the GAM allied with the two Socialist Parties 
(PSU, Parti Socialiste Unifié, Unified Socialist Party and SFIO, Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière, French Section of the Socialist International) and their candidate, 
Hubert Dubedout was elected. This new alliance was called “New Left” because it was the 
first time that a leftist coalition could conquer a municipality without the Communist Party’s 
support. The GAM’s conception of democracy - which was a bottom up one, based on a 
problem-solving approach, and considering the neighbourhood as the first scale of 
intervention- helped to shape the municipal project (Duby, 1985: 594). This political project 
was a global one, and it connected the social and the physical by territorializing municipal 
interventions. Indeed, the sixties and the seventies were marked by the development of 
housing and public facilities, carried out in all neighbourhoods. Indeed, there are lots of 
cultural and social facilities in Villeneuve-VO. More precisely, in the sixth sector 
(Villeneuve, VO and Vigny-Musset), there are 20 elementary schools, 4 public high schools, 
4 academic institutes, 3 social centres, 4 libraries, 3 cultural centres, 8 sports facilities, 13 
social and cultural centres for children and teenagers, etc. There are also 150 associations in 
all fields.
15
 
 
The socialist experience of the sixties and seventies allows to understand better why 
local democracy structures are so rooted in the city. Even if GAM have disappeared, local 
associations such as UQ have remained active since this period. Moreover, other local 
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 http://www.grenoble.fr/jsp/site/Portal.jsp?page_id=357  
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democracy structures were created, such as neighbourhood councils or, more recently, CCS.
16
 
Indeed, currently, according to one elected official, the Municipality is supported by a 
network composed of 250-300 people, ¼ of whom are inhabitants, who often belong to 
associations, UQ, house renters associations, etc. According to the deputy mayor in charge of 
urban policy, the rest of the network is composed of professionals such as social street 
workers, teachers, social housing administrators, etc. (Motte, 2003: 318). So it can be 
considered that the local government can use this well-rooted network to channel citizens’ 
demands in general and the security one in particular.  
 
Traditional mediation channel in France and in Italy: Mayors VS political parties? 
 
I tend to support the analysis made by Della Porta and Andretta (2001; 2002), that are 
based on Pizzorno’s one about political party crisis (Pizzorno, 1996). As they noticed:  
 
“If the phenomenon of citizens’ committees can, as we have hypothesized, be understood within a more general 
process of the restructuring of political representation -evidenced mainly by the decline of the parties’ capacity 
for social and territorial rootedness, the loss of their hold on civil society and the weakening of their capacity to 
bring together demands and influence decision-making processes- then the birth of citizens’ committees should 
obviously coincide neatly with the emergence of these elements of crisis in the political system. [...] the phase in 
which committees started to organize more often coincided with the years of the political crisis in Italy that has 
been defined in successive stages as ‘the crisis of the First Republic’.” (Della Porta and Andretta, 2002: 250) 
 
The traditional political party crisis could explain the diffusion of citizens’ committees 
representing very small pieces of districts: the decline of territorialized party structures and 
the lack of alternative forms of mediation prevent committees from being co-ordinated, and 
consequently their demands remain fragmented. Italian municipalities henceforth tend to play 
the channelling role that political parties used to play in the past. The point is that in France, 
the Mayor has been in the front line for a longer time since he has an older territorial 
legitimacy (due to direct universal suffrage) compared to the Italian Mayor. In Grenoble, 
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 CCS were created in 2002. They were proposed by the left wing candidate during the 2001 municipal election, 
and then provided for by the 2002 law about “proximity democracy” that encouraged the development of local 
structures of participation (they were created in all big French cities, and differently untitled). CCS are composed 
of 50 people (belonging to associations or not), nominated by the Municipal Council. They are co-chaired by a 
CCS member, elected by all the others, and the Municipal official in charge of the district. It must be recalled 
that Grenoble is divided into 6 districts and Villeneuve-VO and Vigny-Musset belong to the sixth one. CCS are 
assemblies dedicated to making proposals to the Municipality as regards different domains such as town 
planning, housing, public transport, etc. Each CCS has a 10,000 € functioning budget and is technically 
supported by the municipal administration. 
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since local democracy structures have always existed, it can be hypothesized that individual 
or collective security demands have always been collected by them and channelled towards 
the Municipality. Therefore, Modena’s project can also be understood as a way of 
institutionalisation of the citizens’ movement. Poletti (2005) pointed out that what he called 
“institutional committee” – “a group characterized by permanent duration, that takes shape 
after a perceived emergency but tries to solve it through constant relationships with 
institutions”- was the most diffused type in Modena. That kind of committee is the most 
involved in the local policy-making process. Besides, he added that this kind of community 
participation had increased proximity between citizens and the local government. For 
instance, a local “observatory” was created in Circumscription 2, under the supervision of the 
Circumscription chairman. Shopkeepers and active residents participate in these periodical 
meetings (three or four times a year) aimed at gathering information on some problematic 
issues, especially in the area surrounding the residential estate targeted by the Neighbourhood 
Contract II. The association “Non da soli” (“Not alone”) represents another example of 
institutionalisation, since it was created in 1996 by some members of the comitato Modena 
Est. The association, which provides material and psychological support for victims, is 
financed by the Municipality. 
It can be then hypothesized that citizens’ committees could become one of the new 
mediation channels local governments need in Italy. Obviously, effective representation 
problems do exist. Poletti (2002; 2005) put it clearly about citizens’ committees in Modena, 
as other researchers had already done before, underlining the exclusive character of 
community safety practices, since they are often based on an active minority’ s participation 
(see for instance Crawford, 1995; Gilling, 1997; 2001; Skogan, 1990).  
 
It is now useful to try to generalize our conclusions to test their pertinence. As I have 
already mentioned, citizens’ committees emerged in different urban centres in Central and 
Northern Italy, and not only in Modena or in Emilia-Romagna, whereas this kind of 
mobilizations, based on security topics are quite rare in France. Does it mean that all local 
governments in France channel social demands as the City of Grenoble does? Is the sensitive 
neighbourhoods’ urban and social configuration the only explanation for the quasi absence of 
community participation in France? Some authors such as Crawford (1995), Gilling (1997) or 
Skogan (1990) underlined how much it was uneasy to make community participate in 
“sensitive neighbourhoods”, characterized by low levels of trust and high feelings of 
insecurity. As Gilling noticed: 
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« In particular, high crime communities remain fundamentally divided, so that there is no basis for 
reconciliation between victim and offender, even when these are one and the same person. There is also little 
basis for collective informal social control, and thus the point at which this meets with formal control agencies 
remains vague and ill-defined, especially as these latter are hardly bound together in a consensual mould. »  
(Gilling, 1997: 200) 
 
But it could be argued that not only deprived neighbourhoods are concerned by 
security problems and that middle classes could mobilize. The few examples of collective 
actions regarding security that have occurred in France bring me to formulate another 
hypothesis: collective actions regarding security are framed as anti-democratic and therefore 
rejected by the population and the politicians. This particular French framing could be due to 
a historical trauma, which dates from WWII. 
 
 
4. Fourth set of hypotheses: historical collective traumas as key explanatory 
factors 
 
 
The process of (re)building (local) identities -based on the exclusion of “out-groups” 
(Elias and Scotson, 1965), i.e. immigrants- that was observed in Modena (Chiodi, 1997-
1998), but also in Bologna (Sebastiani, 2001), was made impossible in France because of the 
way two major historical traumas -i.e. the Vichy period and the Algerian War- generated deep 
cleavages in the French society and influenced the political class’ ideas. The memory of 
militia and denouncement still casts a shadow on mobilizations about security in France, and 
prevents the officials from involving citizens in the governance of security. The Algeria War 
generated a deep political taboo about integration strategies for the second generation of 
immigrants and their involvement into crime, whereas it was one of the dimensions of the 
security issue that had to be tackled. On the opposite, the Italian way of defining the security 
issue is tightly related to immigration, as illustrated by press articles and political debates. 
Some constructivist analysis tended to underline that foreign immigrants in Italy were the new 
excluded citizens (Dal Lago, 1999; Palidda, 2000; Tosi, 2003), especially with the lack of 
national policy of integration for these new migrants. In France, beyond the Republican 
model of integration, successive national policies have avoided to tackle the problem of 
integration for the youth born of immigrants since the eighties. The French model of “social 
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prevention” and then the urban policy called “politique de la ville” were both based on a 
social un-differentiation between delinquents and young people, both targeted in “sensitive” 
neighbourhoods, only defined on a territorial basis.  
 
Fascism VS Democracy: the French “Vichy syndrome”  
 
A recent example can be mentioned to illustrate this idea of a “Vichy syndrome”. In 
December 2003, in Douai (a Northern city governed by the right wing), the police 
superintendent proposed to coordinate some “citoyens-relais”, that is to say sentinels in 
charge of reporting crime and disorders committed in their neighbourhood. The municipal 
council unanimously rejected the proposal,
17
 which means that there was a political 
consensus on that topic. This example is quite interesting since the proposal made by this 
superintendent clearly looks like what happened in Modena (see Poletti, 2002). The municipal 
council evoked the protection of democracy to justify their decision. 
The Vichy period gave birth to the French Militia, i.e. some French people tracking 
down Jewish people but also other French people, especially thanks to denouncement. Since 
this historical event, collective action in the field of security has often been associated with 
denouncement and militia, so that there is a strong consensus in the population, in particular 
among civil servants and officials, that security must be provided by professionals in charge 
(Donzelot et al., 2003; Donzelot and Wyvekens, 2004; Roché, 1998b: 115-151). If one looks 
at the evolution of public opinion concerning crime, the support given to any further 
collaboration between the public and the police is very low. To the question “what should be 
done to improve public safety?”: if harsher sentences grew up from 33 % from June 1990 to 
47.8 % in January 1998, collaborate with police and gendarmes remained stable and even 
slightly decreased, from 20.7 to 19 % (Poll Credoc-IHESI, 1990-1998, quoted in De Maillard, 
2006). It must be precised that, in spite of the Vichy trauma, some individual denouncements 
still happen, as the Municipal Police Manager in Grenoble pointed out.
18
 It means that 
“collective denouncement” is avoided but that “individual denouncement” still happens. 
Besides, Donzelot and Wyvekens (2004: 184) have pointed out that the civil servants 
that are involved in security policies (Prefect, Public Prosecutor) have a hierarchical 
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 http://www.maire-info.com, 12.16.2003. 
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 Interview with the Municipal police Manager in Grenoble, January 2006. During this interview, he showed me 
some photos he had received from residents. If one photo clearly showed a man with a gun walking through the 
central park in Villeneuve, another one only showed two young people talking. The latter was sent by a resident 
who asked the Municipal police manager if these two young people were delinquents or not.  
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legitimacy but not a territorial one, unlike local officials such as the Mayor. Therefore, the 
diffusion of community policing practices -which come from a criticism of the traditional 
police model (Crawford, 1997: 46) and implies civil servants accountability to the local 
population- has been obstructed in France. It is true that the watchword “proximity” means 
bringing institutions and deprived districts’ residents nearer, in order to fight against their 
feeling of neglect (Donzelot et al., 2002), but three kinds of criticism are often made by 
professionals: the public is not enough skilled; their participation may be said as being 
illegitimate; they may endanger themselves (Roché, 2002). It seems obvious that these 
criticisms prevent civil servants and professionals from co-involving the local population in 
the security co-production.  
On the opposite, the neighbourhood watch structure implemented in Modena can be 
considered as the strategy implemented by the local authorities, i.e. relying on the auto-
organisation of civil society by reactivating informal social mechanisms of control. As De 
Maillard (2006) has noticed, Garland (2001: 124) has argued that the US and the UK would 
have been characterised by a process of responsibilization of private actors (citizens, the 
community, individuals, private firms) by trying to help them use their competences. 
According to some local representatives, the same principle guided the municipal policy in 
Modena. 
It was all the more easy to implement as citizens’ committees don’t seem to be 
suspected of antidemocratic attitudes. It is all the more interesting to wonder why as Italy has 
also been marked by a Fascist government and then a civil war between Democrats and 
Fascists. The study of the sociological characteristics of committees’ members can help to 
understand this peculiarity. Among the numerous researches carried out on citizens’ 
committees that have been mentioned earlier, some common elements seem to emerge as 
regard their members’ sociological characteristics: strong territorial identity (old residents, 
often owners); anterior leftist associative experiences in some cases; leaders with high 
education levels; inter-classes composition; high standard of living. As Melossi sums it up:  
 
“Citizens’ committees have appeared especially in those areas undergoing deep change in terms of urban 
renewal and socio-economic development, as research done in Emilia-Romagna (Selmini, 1997), Milan 
(A.A.S.TER, 1997), Turin (IRES, 1995) and Genoa (Petrillo, 1995), has shown. Especially in traditional 
working class areas of the North, the community organizations active ‘against’ crime often draw their members 
from retired workers, former trade unionists and other persons already familiar with social and political 
participation, often also former Leftists.” (Melossi, 2003: 384) 
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Indeed, it is important to recall that Modena has continuously been governed by left 
party coalitions since the end of the Second World War and belongs to the Italian “Red 
subculture” (Caciagli, 1995), i.e. the Communist one. The Region Emilia-Romagna was a 
place of Resistance against the fascist government during WWII, so that its support to 
democracy can’t be denied. Melossi pointed it out well when he quoted “one of the leaders of 
a committee in Modena, who had been active in the anti-Fascist Resistance” (2003: 384), 
originally quoted by Selmini (1997: 82). According to Melossi, these citizens seem to 
mobilize to defend the “democratic order” some of them have helped to build. This analysis 
seems therefore quite close to Roché’s one about incivilities as a threat, not to “public order”, 
but to “order in public (spaces)” (Roché, 2002: 131):  
 
“The discourse is not so much about crime but seems to be about disorder and incivilities. The rules of the 
democratic order are those built during and after the Second World War, starting with the anti-Fascist 
Resistance:  
 
We built this town. I remember, we – some friends of mine and I – drained a marsh and made a road, nearby . . . 
And we worked for nothing. We wanted to do something for our town, and many of us had this spirit, after the 
Second World War, when the towns were destroyed . . . And now, what we have done is despised. (Selmini, 
1997: 83)  
 
We want the town to come back to the period of the great Mayors after the Resistance period . . . We made a lot 
of sacrifices for the community, to reconstruct the towns . . . and now . . . (Selmini, 1997: 83)  
 
A feeling of nostalgia pervades the stories told by these leaders: nostalgia for one’s town, as it once was, for a 
sense of community, especially of political community, which seems to have disappeared – in an area where 
traditionally left-wing organizations used to be very strong. A feeling of nostalgia for the hegemonic role these 
citizens once played in the political and social life of their city, and also regret for local institutions, that used to 
be ‘their’ institutions, but which are now perceived as more and more distant from the citizens.” (Melossi, 2003: 
84) 
 
So, this historical peculiarity can help understanding why citizens who protest on 
security topics in these regions can’t be suspected of Fascism (Della Porta and Mosca, 2002), 
since anti-Fascism is one of the main characteristics of the “Red subculture” (Caciagli, 1995). 
In France, on the opposite, the threat of Fascism and militia has always been used to criticize 
this kind of initiatives. As a consequence, collective mobilizations on security topics are quite 
rare, and often occur to protest against violence, but not to ask for more security.  
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Security, immigration and integration: French political taboos and Italian definition of 
problems 
 
What is striking in Modena is the meaning of the citizens’ mobilizations. It is useful to 
bear in mind that citizens’ committees promoted a petition to ask for law enforcement as 
regarded illegal immigrants who committed crime. One aspect of the security issue in general 
lies in the statistical relations between crime and immigration. If the question of immigrants’ 
deviance has been tackled by researchers since the thirties in the USA (see for instance the 
culture conflict theory elaborated by Sellin, 1938), it has been studied later in France (for a 
brief state of the art in France, see Mucchielli, 2003) and in Italy, where the first rigorous 
quantitative research dates from 1998 (Barbagli, 1998a; 2002). As Mucchielli noticed:  
 
“In France as in most western countries, the immigrant is strongly associated with delinquency in collective 
representations and in media and political discourses concerning « insecurity ». This association can be 
decomposed into two distinct concerns: the delinquency of foreigners and the delinquency of French youth born 
of immigrant. ” (Mucchielli, 2003) 
 
The main difficulty is that there are no statistical data bases about ethnic origins -because they 
are considered as opposed to this conception of citizenship- and therefore there is a deep lack 
of academic studies and researches on the topic. Nobody tackled the issue in the political 
sphere before the rise of a political party, the National Front, which won votes in the eighties 
thanks to the immigration and crime stakes. Roché (1994) had already noticed that the fear of 
the far-right wing had obstructed the emergence of a calm and real debate on integration 
strategies for French youth born of immigrants. This relation has been dealt with an 
ideological way for a long time: on the one hand, accusations made by the far-right wing, and 
then the right wing; and, on the other hand, the left wing anti-racism movements. Over the 
nineties, the cleavage has been partly blurred up (Mucchielli and Robert, 2002), especially 
with the political turn made by the Socialist Party and the Jospin Government (1997-2002) on 
security topics, and more particularly juvenile delinquency. Some discourses admitting that 
there was an overrepresentation of youth born of African immigrants among juvenile 
delinquents started emerging (Mucchielli, 2003).
19
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 For instance, Christian Delorme, the “curé des Minguettes” -i.e. the priest who attended the first events of 
urban violence in 1981 in Lyons’s banlieue, and played an active role in the collective actions lead by youth 
born of immigrants in the eighties- noticed, during the parliamentary inquiry about juvenile delinquency, that:  
“In France, we don’t manage to say certain things, sometimes for nice reasons. It is the same for the over-
delinquency of youth born of immigrants, which has been denied for a long time, in order not to stigmatize. We 
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Thanks to a self-reported crime study carried out in 1999, Roché was the first 
researcher to point out that there was a genuine overrepresentation of French youth born of 
immigrants among juvenile delinquents (Roché, 2001). Indeed, approximately 40% of the 
French prisoners have their father who was born in a foreign country, and among them, 25% 
in Northern Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) (Cassan et al., 2000). Roché underlined that 
the youth born of immigrants concentrated some factors associated with juvenile delinquency, 
i.e. lower parents supervision, more frequent residence’s location in social housing area (out 
of the centre), lower income and graduate levels of the parents, more frequent school-leaving 
(Roché, 2001: 221). 
The study on juvenile delinquents in Isère, carried out by Roché and Dagnaud (2003) 
over a fifteen-year period, provided the same results. 66.5% of the court cases studied had 
their father who was born in a foreign country, 49.8% of them in North Africa (and 33.3% of 
them in Algeria). The analysis of immigration flows in Isère allowed to conclude that the 
large proportion of youth born of immigrants didn’t result from a particular concentration of 
North Africa immigrants in this department. More generally speaking, it is necessary to recall 
that in France, half of the immigrants come from a European country. According to the two 
researchers, in 1999, 63% of the North African family heads in Isère were Algerian, but in the 
judiciary statistics, the proportion of young people born in Algeria compared to those born in 
the whole North Africa was higher. 
In Italy, Barbagli has underlined that the lack of integration for new immigrants could 
help them falling into crime (Barbagli, 1998a). And some observers have underlined to what 
extent the French model of integration had failed. As Crawford pointed out:  
 
“Increasingly, some French commentators have become more willing to recognize that the model of integration 
is in crisis (Wieviorka, 1997). And yet, at the level of politics, there remains ambivalence. On the one hand, 
Universalist strategies fail to accommodate the diverse cultural and plural social make-up of modern France. On 
the other, the politics of targeting particular areas is criticized for turning its back on the republican ideal and 
simultaneously encouraging a process of ghettoization. In consequence, there is a hesitant movement between 
universalist discourse and differentialist practice, in which the politics of insecurity has become increasingly 
racialized.” (Crawford, 2002: 228) 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
have waited that the reality of neighbourhoods, police stations, courts, prisons set the evidence of this over-
representation to admit it publicly. However, politicians don’t know how to speak of it.” (Délinquance des 
mineurs: la République en quête de respect, report to President of the Senate, June 2002, quoted by Dagnaud and 
Roché, 2003: 15-16). 
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These tensions between ideal and reality do illustrate the political taboo that has 
characterized the issue in France for twenty five years. Besides, the refusal to use the word 
“community” in France is another symptom. It is a republican symbolic that remains strong in 
the public discourses: any reference to communities is most of the time reduced to its ethnic 
dimension and is seen as undermining the collective basis and the unity of the French society. 
“Communities” (or any religious or cultural specificity) must remain in the private sphere. It 
is of course hypocrisy: designating some priority areas is a way dealing with specific ethnic 
populations, denying the existence of ethnic minorities in public discourses doesn’t prevent 
from practical arrangements with their leaders. It is therefore easy to understand why, from a 
French point of view, the Italian way of defining the security problem as tightly linked to 
immigration is quite striking, especially in Modena where citizens’ committees promoted the 
petition that gave birth to the Turco-Napolitano law.  
First of all, Italy is a more recent immigration country. On the opposite, the country 
has been marked by emigration for years, but also by strong internal migrations, especially 
from the poor and agrarian South to the rich and industrialized North. This element is quite 
important to notice, because it means that first extra-European Community migrants only 
arrived at the beginning of the nineties, so that it can be thought that integration problems 
regarding the youth born of immigrants haven’t happened yet. Nevertheless, the internal 
migration flow within the country has familiarized some Italians with the immigration 
phenomenon: Northern and Central Italians who lived in areas marked by a lack of workers 
have known the massive arrival of Southern workers. Indeed, migration flows in Italy have 
always had a strong economic dimension. Today, immigration fluxes are partly indispensable 
for the Italian economy. Some sectors are quasi exclusively provided for by new migrants, 
such as agrarian works, low qualified industrial jobs, manufactures or in house services for 
people (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004: 77). 
Second, the overrepresentation of foreign people among delinquents has been proved 
in Italy (Barbagli, 1998a; 2002) and the debate on security has always been tightly connected 
to that on immigration. For instance, the Home Minister (Napolitano, 1997) claimed in 1997 
that: 
 
« Foreign criminality in Italia was fed by the increasing number of non European immigrants coming from 
developing countries, who remained in Italia over the legal period, in a desperate search of solutions to their 
elementary problems of survival. » quoted by (quoted by Barbagli, 1998a: 8) 
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In this context, it is interesting to examine public opinion about immigration. On the 
one hand, there is a strong trend among public opinion to consider immigration as a source of 
crime. This trend has been rising since the end of the nineties, especially in Northern Italy, 
among old pensioners, and in big cities, i.e. over 100,000 inhabitants (Bordignon and 
Diamanti, 2001). On the other hand, Chiodi’s analysis about immigration and insecurity in 
Crocetta has clearly pointed out that there were several categories of immigrants according to 
the committees’ leaders that she had interviewed, which can be summed up as the “wrong” 
ones, who had come to Italy to traffic and commit crime, such as street pushers, often 
associated with North-Africa immigrants; and the “right” ones, who had come to work, such 
as Black people (Chiodi, 1997-1998). Melossi and Selmini have underlined to what extent 
these immigrants were perceived as threatening the existing democratic order: 
 
“The attention of these “communitarian groups” focuses in particular on crime and deviance among recent 
immigrants groups and their visibility in the everyday life of the neighbourhood. At the core of the problem there 
no longer seems to be simply a threat to one’s property or personal safety, but rather a generalised risk for the 
whole society, for an idea of order -of democratic order [...].” (Melossi and Selmini, 2000: 159) 
 
 
The local way of defining the security and immigration problem in (Northern) Italy 
seems to be based on a strict differentiation between delinquents and the rest of the 
population, even if it can lead to focussing on immigrants and distinguishing between 
« right » and « wrong » immigrants. The criterion of legality - that is to say helping new legal 
migrants to integrate, even if there is no national integration policy for immigrants
20
- has been 
promoted as the main principle that guided policies in Modena
21
, but also in Bologna
22
. So, it 
can be argued that a strong local identity has made easier the definition of an “outgroup”, all 
the more as it is composed of “visible” people. In Villeneuve-VO, according to a municipal 
official, one of the main problems in this neighbourhood is that the police have now to cope 
with “crime hard cores”, i.e. hyperactive delinquents who are responsible for a large part of 
crime, who live there
23
. Indeed, Roché’s study on juvenile delinquents in Isère –based on the 
analysis of judiciary archives from 1985 to 2000- pointed out that 53% of the offenders who 
                                               
20
 This way of framing the issue obviously recalls the “culture of legality” that has been promoted for years in 
Southern Italy to fight against mafias. “Culture of legality” is still a part of a lot of projects developed by the 
PON (Programma Operativo Nazionale, National Operative Program), i.e. a national security plan for the South 
aimed at encouraging the economic development. 
21
 Interview with the former Mayor of Modena, June 2005. 
22
 Interview with the former Mayor of Modena and the Mayor of Bologna, June 2005. 
23
 Interview with the director of the security and crime prevention municipal department, January 2006. 
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lived in Grenoble (29.5% of the cases studied) lived in Teisseire, Villeneuve or Mistral 
(Dagnaud and Roché, 2003: 21). So, it could be hypothesized that this element makes 
citizens’ mobilizations more uneasy in some neighbourhoods, all the more as the local 
identity is weaker. 
Moreover, even if the “banlieue” phenomenon seems undoubtedly less diffused in 
Italy than in France, it is undeniable that the French experience seems to play a rejection role 
among civil servants and elected officials. Italian newspapers, but more generally newspapers 
in the whole world, strongly stigmatized the last November urban riots. It could even be 
hypothesized that there is a sort of learning effect for recent immigration countries, whose 
officials seem to take the issue into consideration. For instance, a statistical study for the City 
of Bologna, entitled  “periferie urbane e ghetti: gli immigrati a Bologna, 2001-2006” and 
supervised by M. Barbagli, clearly underlined that there was no significant statistical 
correlation between areas where new migrants lived and the unemployment rate, which meant 
that immigrants didn’t live in the economically weakest areas.  
 
In France, the Republican model of integration has obstructed any social 
differentiation, and since the eighties, successive Governments have been promoting a blind 
territorial differentiation that has condemned “sensitive” neighbourhoods’ residents to be 
stigmatized as if they were delinquents. The Home Minister’s declaration about “scum”, 
before urban violence started, and the deep polemic it caused, do illustrates this idea. On the 
one hand, the Home Minister claimed that “youth people” didn’t mean “delinquents” and that 
some “scum” ruined the whole neighbourhood’s life ; on the other hand, his detractors 
underlined that there were not only delinquents in these neighbourhoods, and young people 
born of immigrants who lived there felt insulted.  
The last urban violence events in France allowed the emergence of renewed discourses 
about integration and citizens’ involvement. Some citizens got involved in foot patrolling 
under the supervision of the Mayor in several cities, without being accused of Fascism.
24
 On 
the opposite, the defence of democratic order was evoked to justify these mobilizations. It 
can’t be denied that this element is quite new in the French political landscape and would 
have to be analyzed if the trend was confirmed. As far as the immigration issue is concerned, 
                                               
24
 See for instance the case of Asnières, located close to Paris, where the mayor organized patrols composed of 
citizens (in fact mainly workers employed by the municipality and political activists). Without being armed, 
there were charged of missions of surveillance and dialogue with youngsters. This operation limited in time and 
scale had mainly a media objective (see Libération, 11.11.2005) and citizens patrols were not supervised by the 
Police (see Le Monde.fr, AFP, 11.08.2005). 
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it seems to be tackled more frankly in the Italian political debate, but without any national 
measure regarding immigrants’ immigration, in spite of political discourses. On the one hand, 
the French model of territorial differentiation, through territorial affirmative action, can be 
criticized; on the other hand, the social differentiation on which local communities are based 
can make immigrants’ integration harder. We can hope that a third way could emerge between 
the two, and the legality criterion, experimented at the local level in Italy and hardly outlined 
at the national level in France, could be the first step toward a well-balanced model.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Starting from the analysis of two participative projects in Modena and Grenoble, I 
have tried to explain the key explanatory factors of community participation in the field of 
security, even if some components are still hypotheses and lack pieces of evidence.  
The main idea is that in front of security problems, one has three main adaptation 
strategies: exit, voice or loyalty (Hirschman, 1970).  Citizens who could afford it have left the 
neighbourhood that has started declining; those who couldn’t leave by lack of economic 
capital retracted (Roché, 2002). This is what has often happened in some French 
neighbourhoods, where middle classes have left (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997). But why 
have other citizens chosen voice? Roché has pointed out that fear of crime depends on crime 
rates, but the way it is expressed by citizens depends on their personal exposition to crime, 
and their vulnerability (Roché, 1998a). I would add that the way they express a security 
demand partly depends on their political culture. I think that a specific political culture, based 
on a strong territorial identity can explain why some residents have refused to leave. There are 
some pieces of evidence in Northern Italy, where some components of the Red political 
subculture -i.e. localism, a diffused network of associations ideologically oriented and a deep 
feeling of territorial membership (Trigilia, 1981; 1986)- can explain the citizens’ committees 
phenomenon. Since voice is allowed by the existence of diffused social capital, it can be 
thought that in Villeneuve, some citizens –those who have been living in the neighbourhood 
since the beginning, and who belong to local networks of associations- have also chosen 
voice, i.e. to express a security demand as defined by Roché (1998b). But, as in Villeneuve 
there were rooted local mediation channels (Motte, 2003), their security demand was 
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institutionally channeled, whereas in Modena and more generally in Northern Italy, the 
political party crisis has dismantled the existing mediation channels. The political party crisis 
could therefore explain the emergence of citizens’ committees, especially in regions where 
civic traditions were deeply rooted, such as in Emilia-Romagna (Putnam et al., 1993). The 
way some citizens’ committees have been institutionalized in Modena could confirm this 
idea: the local government is creating its own mediation channels, especially thanks to 
circumscriptions. It can be imagined that in Villeneuve-VO, the local government has 
implemented a “taken under control” consultative process to cope with the “voice” expressed 
by the deeply rooted citizens, i.e. taking them into consideration while preventing the 
emergence of collective protest, since we have seen that in France, officials are reluctant to 
admit citizens’ involvement in the co-production of security (Roché, 2002), party because of 
what we have called the “Vichy syndrome”. Lastly, as regards the meaning of mobilizations 
in Italy, we think that the strong territorial identities that exist –as components of political 
subcultures- have favoured the protest against a well-defined out-group (Chiodi, 1997-1998), 
i.e. illegal immigrants who commit crime. Della Porta has underlined to what extent the 
citizens’ committees phenomenon can be considered as the expression as a growing 
preoccupation towards immigration in the nineties (2004b). In Modena, the strong territorial 
differentiation between residents and new immigrants has made easier a social differentiation 
based on the legality criterion. In France, the Republican model of integration has made this 
kind of social differentiation uneasy, all the more as the immigration and security issues have 
only been tackled by a far-right political party. It would therefore be interesting to investigate 
the meaning of the security demand as expressed in Grenoble to understand how citizens 
define security problems in their neighbourhood.  
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Glossary 
 
CCS: Conseils Consultatifs de Secteurs, Neighbourhood Consultative Councils  
CPOSP: Comitato Provinciale per l’Ordine e la Sicurezza Pubblica, Provincial Committee 
for Order and Public security 
CPT: Centro di Permanenza Temporanea, Temporaneous-Stay Center 
DS: Democratici di Sinistra, Left Democrats 
GAM: Groupe d’Action Municipale, Municipal Action Group 
GIR: Groupes d’Intervention Régionaux, Intervention Regional Groups 
PON: Programma Operativo Nazionale, National Operative Program 
PSU: Parti Socialiste Unifié, Unified Socialist Party 
SFIO: Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, French Section of the Socialist 
International 
UQ: Union de Quartiers, Neighbourhoods Union 
ZRU: Zone de Redynamisation Urbaine, Urban Re-vitalization Zone  
ZUP: Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité, Priority Urbanisation Zone  
ZUS: Zone Urbaine Sensible, Sensitive Urban Zone   
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